Showing posts with label international law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label international law. Show all posts

08 July, 2018

Torture (II)

A draft review of Manfred Nowak, Torture: An Expert's Confrontation with an Everyday Evil (Philadelphia: U of PA Press, 2018).  Translated from the German by Roger Kaminker.

The author was the UN Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights Council from 2004 to 2010.  He has also worked with the EU, universities, and NGOs to  investigate cases of torture, promote prosecutions of offenders, and improve conditions of detention.  Yet one of his first observations is that past all the definitions and descriptions of torture, "we cannot fully grasp its essence if we have never experienced it."  And while torture is universally condemned in international law, this direct attack on the essence of what it means to be human is used--"routinely"--by the police of most of the world's states.  The author hopes, by exploring the depths of the evil torture involves, to promote the sense of outrage prompted by the reporting on the Holocaust. Clearly, instruments of international law are not enough. He wants "a new global consensus to effectively eradicate torture."  I sense he will be waiting a long time.

Novak's description of the operations of the United Nations follows a familiar pattern: noble goals, undermined by state practice. Systematic cruelty is hidden behind a wall of lies.  So he describes how, as an investigator, he had to work under the rules promulgated by each state he was investigating. And he explores how it was possible, sometimes, to work within those rules and still learn something of value. Arranging confidential interviews and medical examinations was crucial.  When victims would describe, without police in the room, what had been done to them the evidence would almost always back up their stories. And these are the states that allowed interviews.  At some level, the officials of those states believed (or told themselves) it "wasn't so bad."  Or at the very least they thought they could whitewash the conditions sufficiently to get out of the international spotlight.  It says a lot that neither Russia or the United States would allow these interviews to take place.

The book is divided into two parts.  Part one is an overview of torture, inhuman detention, and other "cruel, inhuman, or degrading" treatment.  Despite the Convention, what counts as torture varies by region and culture. Corporal punishment and capital punishment? At the insistence of many Islamic states, the UN Convention against torture does not include pain or suffering arising from "lawful" sanctions. Like those who define "terrorism" as the act of a non-state, this is potentially a loophole that renders the Convention meaningless.  At the same time, if a state does not enact legislation (and enforce it) against private acts of dehumanizing violence, it endures as the norm.

Part two is a survey, chapter by chapter, of torture in individual states. These are based on Nowak's investigations, ranging from Georgia to Mongolia, Nepal to China, Jordan to Austria, he established torture had occurred in seventeen of eighteen states.  The only counterexample he found, Denmark, began with a very different model of what a prisoner is and what a prison is for.  A retributionist system must be replaced by one that sees the prisoner as a human being, with all the rights that involves,working to integrate himself back into the community. We have a long way to go.

28 February, 2012

Clearing my desk

WASHINGTON - OCTOBER 28:  U.S. Attorney Genera...
Eric Holder at the signing of the NDAA by Getty Images via @daylife

It's been too long since I posted here, so I'll start by clearing up a few "must reads":

(1) The NDAA Makes it Harder to Fight Terrorism | Foreign Affairs: Brian Michael Jenkins is one the world's greatest experts on international terrorism. He started the RAND Corporation research program on terrorism in 1972. (Where were you in 1972?) When he points out that the liberty-stripping provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act will do nothing to facilitate the prosecution of the war on terrorism, and will in fact harm it, all I can add is "amen". But then he adds something I hadn't thought of. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force Resolution is the post-9/11 act authorizes the use of force to kill or capture those responsible for 9/11 and to prevent future international terrorist attacks. The NDAA allows the detention of terrorist suspects "until the end of hostilities," as authorized by the AUMF. Assuming there is no official statement that the war is "forever" there will come a time when

the United States will consider its military mission against terrorism to be over. Declaring an end to the military campaign, however, would remove the country's legal basis to hold enemy combatants. Pressure would increase to release detainees. While lawyers and legislators try to work out the ambiguous post-hostilities status of detainees, those convicted of crimes in civilian courts will remain locked away in jail, serving out fair sentences.
I might add that as time passes the question of whether the military mission is "over" will itself become a political question. Already combat pay is being cut for soldiers in Afghanistan. There will be a political bonus for the politician who can claim the "victory" of transforming terrorism from a war back to a normal security problem. (Of course, there will also be those whose jobs and identity are so wrapped up in the current definition of the situation that they'll resist that declaration.) I shudder to think of the question of when a military action "ends" being fought through the federal courts. And even before the issue is settled, there will be lawyers using the ambiguity to call for the release of real mass murderers.

Meanwhile, the people locked up who have nothing to do with terrorism--the majority, I expect, if the history of the (s0-called) PATRIOT Act is any indication--will probably be the last to get out.

Legal rules exist for a reason. Tampering with them on the spur of the moment--by legislators or by courts--rarely serves the interests of the people. It might help some prosecutors in the short run. It might help some politicians win reelection. But that's their problem. Mine is to keep them from screwing with the rights of the rest of us.

(2) The Pentagon Discloses Military Intelligence Budget Request | Secrecy News: It's 19.2 billion dollars, and that's a drop from the high. It looks like winding down the wars is the primary reason for the decline. And for once, the DoDers (DoDoes?) weren't forced to release the secret. It was just there, in the request, because the relevant Defense Department authorities changed their minds on the need for classification.

There actually is some intelligent life in D.C.

I hope it doesn't harm their careers.

(3) A New Perspective on Cost of War from the folks at Demon*cracy.



The original graphic is huge. You really need to see the original to get the full impact.

Now, if we could just estimate the cost of not going to war we could do a cost-benefit analysis. My suspicion is it wasn't worth it--not this long, not this much, and not at all for Iraq. Whether or not you think the price was worth it, it's clear the price--the immediate price, not counting what it has done to our society and law and politics and economy in the long run--has been huge.

17 January, 2012

A small step in the right direction

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld shares a ...
Image via Wikipedia
I have a dream.

I have a dream where Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld and George Bush are in cages, tried for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of the Bill of Rights.

I'd prefer to see it in an American court. I'd like to think we can police our own, and only an American court can handle Constitutional violations. But I'd be willing to accept handing them over to the International Criminal Court. Perhaps a combined trial with the remaining leadership of Al Qaeda.

If it's the best we can do, I'd even accept a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, similar to that after Apartheid in South Africa. At least then we could get the truth out, shame those who thought they cold hide their crimes, and build a consensus to never do it again.

Meanwhile, I have to settle for whatever small steps are made. One of these is a recent report by the World Organization for Human Rights and the Washington College of Law at American University. It's entitled INDEFENSIBLE: A Reference for Prosecuting Torture and Other Felonies Committed By U.S. Officials Following September 11th, and it does a solid job of starting to make the case for the prosecution. From the Table of Contents:
II. The Attorney General Has the Authority to Appoint Special Counsel to Investigate and, Where Warranted, Prosecute Crimes Committed by United States Government Officials.... 20
A. Department of Justice Regulations grant the Attorney General authority to appoint Special Counsel............................................................................. 20
B. The Attorney General also has the power to delegate broad authority to a special prosecutor pursuant to the U.S. Code. ........................................... 32
C. Where the subject matter of the investigation could raise serious conflict of interest issues pertaining to the DOJ, the DOJ regulations should be invoked as the appropriate source of authority for appointing Special Counsel ............. 36
III. The Orchestrated Effort by Former Top-Level Administration Officials to Implement a Detainee Interrogation Program Resulted in the Widespread, Systematic, and Unlawful Abuse and Torture of Detainees ......................... 38
A. High-ranking members of the Bush Administration issued policies or directives
authorizing detainee abuse ................................................................ 39
B. Senior-level U.S. government officials set out to create a legal framework that would justify the use of unlawful interrogation tactics against detainees.......... 48
C. The policies and directives issued by top U.S. government officials authorizing specific interrogation tactics were the direct cause of detainee torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment...................................................................82
IV. High-Ranking U.S. Government Officials Violated U.S. Domestic and International Law by Approving or Facilitating the Use of Torture and Other Forms of Human Rights ViolationsAgainst Terror Suspects ........................114
A. Top U.S. officials unlawfully conspired, facilitated, and directed the commission of torture and other human rights violations in violation of international law......................114
B. Top U.S. officials may also be held criminally accountable for contributing to, or conspiring to commit, crimes in violation of other U.S. federal criminal laws ...................... 117
C. Bush Administration officials conspired to violate the Torture Act by agreeing to, forming, and implementing policies and procedures detailing and recommending acts violating the Torture Act ........................................... 140
D. Officials who have either aided, commanded, or counseled for the commission of felonies, or who conspired to do the same, may be prosecuted in U.S. courts under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 371 ...................................... 156
E. No legal defense may be raised that would preclude investigation or prosecution of individuals who approved or facilitated the commission of torture ..................................... 228
V. Conclusion....................................................240
Maybe I'll use this for my UN and Law class. Have them try the case?

People's Blog for the Constitution » Report calls for prosecution of top government officials for acts of torture

02 January, 2012

Why I am not a "big-L" libertarian

The short answer: for the same reason I'm not an anarchist, or a communist, or whatever--I don't trust absolute principles.

The long answer is articulated by nobel-prize winning economist Ronald Coase in a classic interview:

Reason: Though you are now known as a leading free market economist, you started your intellectual career as a socialist. Why and when did your political views change? 
Coase: They changed gradually. What was most important was the work I did on the economics of public utilities at the London School of Economics. I studied the results of municipal operation of utilities and the effects of nationalization, particularly in the post office. This led to grave doubts about nationalization. It didn't produce the results people said it did. My views have always been driven by factual investigations. I've never started off--this is perhaps why I'm not a libertarian--with the idea that a human being has certain rights. I ask, "What are the rights which produce certain results?" I'm thinking in terms of production, the lives of people, standard of living, and so on. It has always been a factual business with me. I discovered that municipal operation didn't work as well as people said it would, and nationalization did not either. 
Reason: You said you're not a libertarian. What do you consider your politics to be? 
Coase: I really don't know. I don't reject any policy without considering what its results are. If someone says there's going to be regulation, I don't say that regulation will be bad. Let's see. What we discover is that most regulation does produce, or has produced in recent times, a worse result. But I wouldn't like to say that all regulation would have this effect because one can think of circumstances in which it doesn't. 
Reason: Can you give us an example of what you consider to be a good regulation and then an example of what you consider to be a not-so-good regulation? 
Coase: This is a very interesting question because one can't give an answer to it. When I was editor ofThe Journal of Law and Economics, we published a whole series of studies of regulation and its effects. Almost all the studies--perhaps all the studies--suggested that the results of regulation had been bad, that the prices were higher, that the product was worse adapted to the needs of consumers, than it otherwise would have been. I was not willing to accept the view that all regulation was bound to produce these results. Therefore, what was my explanation for the results we had? I argued that the most probable explanation was that the government now operates on such a massive scale that it had reached the stage of what economists call negative marginal returns. Anything additional it does, it messes up. But that doesn't mean that if we reduce the size of government considerably, we wouldn't find then that there were some activities it did well. Until we reduce the size of government, we won't know what they are.

(Thanks to Virginia Postrel for reminding me of this interview.)

It's about estimating and observing consequences, within the context of an ethical framework.  What is the right end to achieve, and how do you avoid a means whose anticipated and unanticipated consequences are worse than the original problem you want to solve? Today, in an era of "negative marginal returns," large-scale government action often (usually) makes things worse.  But not always.

Thus, when I hear Ron Paul talk about reducing America's military presence around the world, I think he's on the right track.  I'm willing to be persuaded otherwise, but the knee-jerk interventionism of the past sixty or so years doesn't seem to be supported by the evidence.  When he talks about ending trade treaties, I want to learn what he'll replace them with.  The world is too interdependent for economic artarky.  International law and organizations have emerged, piecemeal for the most part, because they meet a need.  When he talks about removing all social safety nets, even for catastrophic and random events, he sounds wrong both morally and economically.

The big-L Libertarian Party bills itself as the "party of principle," and I admire that.  I also fear it.  The Bolsheviks were a "party of principle," too.  When political principles become so absolute that they get in the  way of observing and thinking and adapting to change, it's time to rethink the principles.

27 December, 2011

Get your own state!


I love micronations. There's something appealing--and pleasantly eccentric--about sticking a flag on a rock, declaring it to be an independent country, and naming yourself emperor. Who hasn't wanted to do that, at one time or another?  Especially at tax time?  I've always admired Sealand.

And sometimes it seems the only way to avoid a big government is to set yourself in charge of a little one.  Seriously, as states come under increasing pressure--and react to it with increasing centralization and restrictions on individuals--I wonder if this may be the wave of the future.

If not for all of us, at least for those who can afford it.
But for now, see Business Insider: Check Out 10 Of Europe's Oddest Micronations. Three examples:
Kingdom Of Elleore

Location: Denmark
Founded: 1944
Ruler: King Leo III
Estimated Population: Unknown. But the population grows in the summer time.
Estimated Size: 15,000 square meters.
About: A small island off Denmark's Northern coast, the Kingdom of Elleore was founded and declared independent when a group of school teachers bought it to organize a summer camp in 1944. The micronation has issued numerous stamps and coins and has had six monarchs since its independence. 
BjornSocialist Republic

Location: Sweden
Founded: 2005
Ruler: President Oskar Augustsson
Estimated Population: Usually Zero.
Estimated Size: Six square meters.
About: Located on a stone that "looks like a tractor," this tiny socialist state near the Bos Islands doesn't recognize Swedish laws and has its own hymn. It made the news when Sweden refused to recognize a marriage between two citizens that allegedly took place on the tiny rock. It claims to be the smallest republic in the world. 
Principality of Filettino

Location: ItalyFounded: 2011
Ruler: Luca Sellari
Estimated Population: 550
Estimated Size: 30 square miles
About: Demonstrating its frustration with Italy's economy and austerity measures, this village decided to break away from th Italian government in August this year. The village intended to invite Prince Emmanuel Filiberto from the deposed Italian royal family to be Prince of their principality.
See the others at Business Insider. And don't forget to renew your passport for Sealand!

12 December, 2011

Oil on the flames (cute title, huh?)

Exxon-Mobil is throwing in with the Kurds in the upcoming battle over Iraq.  The battle takes off again.
Whatever the prospects of finding oil in the north of Iraq, observers are surprised that Exxon is prepared to hang its future in Iraq on the outcome of the power struggle between Iraqi Kurdistan and the central government. Control of the right to explore for oil and exploit it is crucial to the authorities on both sides since they have virtually no other source of revenue. 
The Kurds have won a degree of autonomy close to independence since the fall of Saddam, and the ability to sign oil contracts without reference to Baghdad will be another step towards practical independence and the break-up of Iraq. A parallel would be if the Scottish government were to sign exploration contracts in the North Sea without consulting London. 
What makes the Exxon-KRG deal particularly inflammatory, says Mr Shahristani, is that three of the six blocs where Exxon is planning to drill are understood to be "across the blue line – that is outside the border of the KRG". This means they are in the large areas in northern Iraq disputed between Arabs and Kurds since 2003, but where the Kurds have military control. 
The government must now decide if it will make good on its threats and replace Exxon at a mammoth oil field called West Qurna 1 at the other end of the country, north of Basra. Iraqi oil officials hint that Royal Dutch Shell might replace the American company. 
Both sides have much at stake. The Iraqi government is totally reliant on its oil revenues to pay its soldiers, police force and civilian officials. It needs vast sums to rebuild the country after 30 years of war, civil war and sanctions. In 2009, it began to expand its oil industry by signing contracts with firms such as BP, Royal Dutch Shell and Exxon to boost production in under-exploited and poorly maintained fields. 
These companies thereby gained access to some of the largest fields in the world, each with reserves of more than five billion barrels. Vast sums are being invested, mostly around Basra in the south of Iraq. Oil output, now at 2.9 million barrels a day, is due to rise to a production capacity of 12 million b/d by 2017, potentially putting Iraq on a par with Saudi Arabia as an oil exporter.


Since the Kurds have had a bad deal for generations, my sympathies are with the Kurds.  But even if they succeed to get the state they want, the transition is going to be hard.

Exxon's deal with the Kurds inflames Baghdad

16 October, 2010

Louis Henkin

Louis Henkin, the name at the intersection of Constitutional Law, International Law, and Foreign Policy, has died.  If you have anything  to do with any of those fields, anything I could say would be unnecessary.  If you don't know him, look here and here.  The world's a better place because he lived, and it lost something with his passing.

01 December, 2009

It beats dropping bombs

Serbia is going to the World Court today to get an advisory opinion on the independence of Kosovo. The US and most of the EU has recognized a new Kosovar state; Russia, Serbia, and most of the rest of the world has not. The Serbian Foreign Minister is right to observe that decision to go to court marked a "paradigm shift...the first time in the history of the Balkans that somebody has decided to resolve an issue of significance using exclusively peaceful means." That's a bit of a stretch. Serbia's ambassador to France said that Kosovo's declaration, as well as its recognition, "is a challenge to the international legal order, based as it is on the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity." He's right.

That's really what's at issue here. A Serbian friend of mine constantly reminded me during the Kosovo War that what NATO was doing was a violation of fundamental legal norms, and while he was right he never quite grasped that his point may be increasingly irrelevant. The norms are changing. What are the new norms, and how will they emerge? An advisory opinion of the ICJ isn't going to settle these issues, but it might have some influence on the debate. Keep watching.