(And probably more than some of the Republican presidential candidates, if we are to judge them by their rhetoric.)
First of all, the "Iranians" are not a monolithic group, any more than "Americans" or "Israelis" or "Muslims" or "Science Fiction Geeks." The fact that so many commentators seem to present them as speaking with a single voice is suspicious in itself.
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They falsely accuse the Islamic republic’s establishment of producing nuclear weapons. We fundamentally reject nuclear weapons and prohibit the use and production of nuclear weapons. This is because of our ideology, not because of politics or fear of arrogant powers or an onslaught of international propaganda. We stand firm for our ideology.So what--that was 2009. How about 2010?
We have said repeatedly that our religious beliefs and principles prohibit such weapons as they are the symbol of destruction of generations. And for this reason we do not believe in weapons and atomic bombs and do not seek them.Ok, ok. But that was still years ago. How about last month?
The Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the decision makers in the countries opposing us know well that Iran is not after nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.Does this sound like madness?
So how do we make sense of the Iranian program? In part, it may be just what they say it is, a program to develop their energy infrastructure. The fact that they can be harmed by an embargo on gasoline sales (the Iranians have little ability to refine their own oil) is reason enough to persue this. Besides, they know better than most what their future oil production is likely to be, and what the global market will look like.
Do I buy that? Not entirely. I suspect they want the ability to produce a bomb quickly, as a deterrent, without actually producing or deploying the weapons that might trigger Israeli premption. And it's not just me, sitting in Pennsylvania. More and more Israelis are willing to come out with a similar view. Mier Dagan, the head of the Mossad for eight years, has described the regime in Iran, including Ahmadinajad, as "a very rational regime." The fact that he talks in public at all is impressive. That he came out to say that is remarkable.
So why the drum-beats for war? Is it simply the obsessions of Netanyahu and some personalities? American campaign rhetoric? A chance to manipulate oil prices? Or to sell advanced weapons? To be sure, these are governments that are not going to be friends any time soon. Khamenei still refers to Israel as a "cancerous tumor." All of this is probably part of what's going on, but in the final analysis it doesn't matter: the picture of the Iranians and the Iranian program does not reflect reality, and a policy based on those illusions is an invitation to failure. Maybe catastrophic failure.
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Iran’s establishment may not be planning the active use of nuclear weapons in the immediate future. However, nuclear weapons would give Iran a carte blanche for pursuing a more “active” foreign policy.
For instance, following Saddam Hussein’s footsteps, it may decide to restore its “historic provinces”, Bahrain and Qatar; blackmail other Gulf States into paying it tribute; provide Hezbollah with non-conventional weapons…
First of all...so what? None of those things constitutes an "existential threat" sufficient to justify preemptive or preventive war.
Second, Iran is already working to consolidate its status as the dominant military power around the Persian Gulf. The Iraq War pretty much meant that it will succeed at this, unless (a) the US is willing to pay a lot more to keep it down indefinitely (and I don't mean a one-time strike on the weapons program--that's a delaying tactic at best) and/or (b) Saudi Arabia follows up on its threat to develop (or, more likely, buy from Pakistan) nuclear weapons of its own. Of the two, the second option is probably more of a threat, from the Iranian point of view--and one more reason to avoid deploying a weapon that would trigger that arms race.
(The Saudis may also fall back on their usual plan of buying friends, but they have their own long-term oil production problems, and the demographic facts on the ground don't favor them in a conventional war. The best thing they have going for them is Arabs, as a rule, DON"T LIKE Persians, and will resist domination for their own reasons. And the Iranians know it.)
Iran doesn't need nuclear weapons to threaten its neighbors, or blackmail them with the threat of greater instabilty, or provide greater support to Hezbollah. So why bother? The usual reasons are for status and/or as a deterrent.
Except for some deterrent effect, the actual utility of nuclear weapons is pretty low. And in the Middle East, it's even less of a factor. The Israeli arsenal didn't prevent the 1973 war. There's reason to believe the Soviets promoted the 1967 war in an attempt to stop the Israeli program.
I suspect what gets so many people upset is this: why should Iran threaten to deter *our* freedom of action, or that of Israel? Well, Iran has just as much right to do this, within the NPT (which so far it has adhered to the letter, if not the spirit), as anyone else. And under the rules of the game we don't have the right to attack Iran because of something it *might* do, especially if the thing it *might* do is within its rights as a sovereign state.
Go down that path and you end up with idiocy like the 2003 invasion of Iraq. And the greatest victor in that war, coincidentally, was Iran.
"First of all...so what? None of those things constitutes an "existential threat" sufficient to justify preemptive or preventive war."
At risk of confirming Godwin's law, I must notice that the same was said about Germany's abrogation of the Versailles treaty(1934), followed by remilitarization of Rhineland (1936) and occupation of Austria (1938), Sudetenland (1938) and Czechoslovakia (1939).
"Go down that path and you end up with idiocy like the 2003 invasion of Iraq."
After the WWI disaster western democracies tried to avoid a new conflict at all costs. All they achieved was postponing it for five years at the cost of over 50 million casualties.
Just like after the WWI, after the "idiocy like the 2003 invasion of Iraq" (I pretty much share your feelings here) the American public wishes to return to an isolationist foreign policy.
Well, I can only hope that your analysis is correct and this time the results will be different.
"a one-time strike on the weapons program--that's a delaying tactic at best"
A one-time Israeli strike delayed the Iraqi program quite a bit. I don't think there is a need for anything more (certainly not another "democracy building" attempt a la Iraq).
Iran is not Iraq. Given the extensive Iranian facilities--and how hardened they are--I doubt an attack could delay things more than a few years (three? five?). It might even accelerate a program.
Iran isn't Germany, either. The last time Iran invaded a neighbor was, I believe, 1798. That's a better track record than Germany, and much better than the US.
Am I arguing they are "good guys"? Of course not. They have their interests, and some of them are opposed to ours. They are already willing to sponsor terrorists, and in some cases (the Quds Force) the terrorists are members of the armed forces. They call for the destruction of Israel (although they would probably find it harder to manage internal dissent if they ever managed to remove the external enemy). I don't expect them to develop nuclear weapons (unless they felt shoved into a corner--one of the greatest factors to promote crossing the line and producing a usable weapon is the perception that it is them against the world), but even if they did it wouldn't be the end of the world. It would be bad, and it would raise the risk of miscalculation and accident, but of itself it wouldn't be an existential threat.
The real existential threat to Israel isn't nuclear--it's demographic.
“The last time Iran invaded a neighbor was, I believe, 1798. That's a better track record than Germany, and much better than the US.”
Actually, it was 1971, but such comparisons are in any case not very meaningful. If a militarily weak country like Iran refrains from attacking/provoking strong ones, it hardly proves its pacifism.
“They have their interests, and some of them are opposed to ours.”
Most of the time ideological bombast hides geopolitical interests. However, once in a while irrational statements taken by rationalists for domestic propaganda turn out to be a real political program (e.g., “Mein Kampf”). Are you 100 per cent confident that chants “Death to America” are no more than a symbolic ritual? Or that Shia eschatological beliefs are not taken seriously by Iranian leaders?
It is possible, even somewhat plausible, that the nuclear Iran can be contained like the USSR was in its time. But if not the price will be extremely high. A single air strike might remove this danger for good.
“Given the extensive Iranian facilities--and how hardened they are--I doubt an attack could delay things more than a few years (three? five?).”
Once the nuclear facilities are destroyed it is unlikely that the Iranian government will start rebuilding them anytime soon. Military defeat and the accompanying loss of face risk being fatal for an authoritarian regime (e.g., Falklands War).
“The real existential threat to Israel isn't nuclear--it's demographic.”
Demographic problem threatens virtually all developed countries. However, having one problem does not remove the necessity of dealing with another.
Thanks for correcting the date. I forgot about the taking of Abu Musa. Not much of a military operation, and Iran had the better claim, but if their claim was that the British had no authority to grant rights to the UAE (and there's a good case to be made) they should have let the issue work itself out through the ICJ.
You are right that a lot is about having the power to act. A lot, but not all. The interesting things are the moves they haven't tried. Generally, especially since 1979, they seem to prefer deniability to direct assault.
You may be right about the other stuff, too. There's no certainty in this business. But there are some very high probabilities, in my opinion.
1) Some, but not all, Iranian leaders are looking for the 12th Iman, etc. Some of these wouldn't mind seeing the end of the world, since they consider it a precondition to the construction of the next one.
2) Most aren't. They'd rather stay alive and achieve their goals the old fashioned way. They have a strong interest in keeping the crazies in line.
3) Some of the Iranian people really hate the US. Some really, REALLY hate Israel, and would like to see the Jews driven into the sea.
4) Some of the people chanting "death to America" don't much care, one way or another.
5) Most wouldn't mind getting rid of their enemies--if they could make the Jews disappear at no cost, with the push of a button, they'd do it--but don't want to throw away their lives (or a sizable chunk of their wealth) in the attempt. The one thing that would push them to greater radicalism would be if they felt they were under direct and large-scale attack.
I just noticed: substitute a couple of labels (Muslim fundamentalists for Jews, for example) and much the same things could be said for the United States. Mirror imaging? More like these things are true for most (all?) countries.
One thing I'm pretty sure of:
1) An attack on Iran could be VERY expensive. In one worst-case scenerio, similar to the Millennium Challenge war game conducted in 2002, the US loses. I hope the US learned from that game. I worry that it hasn't (a war game played out a devastating sneak attack on Pearl Harbor in the early 30s--it was ignored). The recent CSIS proposal includes sending troops to take and hold Iranian soil in order to facilitate keeping the Straights open, with all that means for a long-term, ugly commitment. A (classified/leaked) war game earlier this month ("Internal Look," according to the Times) started with an Israeli attack on Iran, and quickly led to regional escalation. Israel hits Iran, Iranians sink an American ship, America retaliates against Iran (which is, after all, what some in Israel want). Or, to avoid that, a long and bloody terrorist campaign. Personally, I consider the estimate to be optimistic.
Maybe I'm wrong--but it worries me more than the prospect of long-term (mutual) deterrence, or an arms race.
I keep thinking of Bismarck's old line: "Preemptive War is like committing suicide for fear of death."
Something that might be true, but I hope isn't:
1) Perhaps the war scare is meant in part to distract from other problems. Or, God help us, provide an excuse for a more "proactive" policy under the guise of emergency measures.
More likely, however, it's another case of the tool determining the definition of the policy. It wouldn't be the first time that's happened.
“substitute a couple of labels (Muslim fundamentalists for Jews, for example) and much the same things could be said for the United States. Mirror imaging? More like these things are true for most (all?) countries.”
There is a crucial difference. Placed with two options – safely “wiping Iran of the map” or establishing normal relations with it (like the times of the Shah) – governments and most citizen of the US, Israel or any other western country would choose the latter.
"Preemptive War is like committing suicide for fear of death."
Given Bismarck’s manner to pose as a peacemaker in between his “wars of choice”, I would take all his pacifist statements with a grain of salt. In general, though, preemptive wars usually made little sense in the XIX century, when Clausewitz’s maxim -“defense is the stronger form of waging war”- was still relevant.
“…Iranians sink an American ship, America retaliates against Iran”
If Iranian government is truly reckless enough to provoke a full-scale war with America now, when it would most likely repeat the fate of Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, how can it be expected to behave when it acquires a nuclear deterrent?
“The one thing that would push them to greater radicalism would be if they felt they were under direct and large-scale attack”
The future is hard to predict, but since history often tends to repeat itself, historical precedents are usually the best predictors of the future. I recall quite a few cases when an authoritarian regime collapsed or became more liberal after a military defeat. I would be really interested in examples to the contrary.
“Perhaps the war scare is meant in part to distract from other problems.”
My own impression is that Obama’s administration is just making a show to escape accusations of inaction.
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