The Bilderberger Meeting Begins

The 67^th Bilderberg Meeting is beginning today, 30 May, in Montreux, Switzerland, and is scheduled to run to June 2nd.  There are reported to be about 130 invitees confirmed from 23 countries.

Needless to say, the conspiracy theorists are besides themselves. They see secret planning events leading to One World Government and a New World Order (damn, these guys like capital letters!) and a general depopulation of the planet. Billions dying! Mind control! Apparent rivals working behind the scenes to attack the common man! Dogs and cats, sleeping together!

Mass hysteria!

Sorry. But it was fun to get that out of my system. And there are conspiracies, always have been. Most of them have failed. The ones that haven't were often working at cross purposes. Seeing a monolith when it isn't there grants the perception of power to people whose greatest power resides in people's perceptions of them. It builds what it claims to be fighting.

If I was inclined to think conspiratorially, I might think the opposition was part of the conspiracy.

And that's why it makes more sense to limit yourself to things that can be seen, and confirmed, and measured. Just because something scares you is no reason to assume it's real. I'd love to see what, if anything, leaks out of this meeting. The fact that these people are selecting themselves as "the elite" (one of them, anyway) is an interesting fact, in and of itself. We can compare what slips out of this meeting with the things that have slipped out over the past sixty-six meetings: white papers, guest lists, agenda items, and so forth. See what's changed, and what hasn't. Make predictions (did ANYONE predict Trump after the prior Bilderberg meeting?) and test them against observations. It's hard to do good work to understand people who don't want to cooperate. Hard, but not impossible.

Then again, Bilderberg meetings may all be Red Herrings. It's not like these people need to get together in a hotel for face-to-face discussions one week a year. I suspect it's more like a professional conference: a place to get away from the office, gossip, and have a few drinks with friends. Maybe even get a little work done, but that's secondary.

It could be an interesting place for some bugs. I imagine the NSA has some there already. The Swiss, too. But I hope there are some from Anonymous. A conspiracy spying on a conspiracy is a good metaphor for our times.

The Bilderbergers in Switzerland

Reading between the lines in Strzok's testimony

It's an old joke among lawyers: If you have the law on your side, argue the law; if you have the facts, argue the facts; if you have neither, pound the table. 

There was a lot of table-pounding (and the occasional foaming at the mouth) at the open hearings yesterday, which attempted to make Peter Strzok into some kind of dark figure and (somehow) defend the president.  It was a failure.  If this is the best they could do, Donald Trump might want to reconsider returning from his foreign trip.  Perhaps Putin would let him stay in Russia. But I doubt that he would.  It's not like Trump was actually an agent.  More like a useful idiot.  And apparently he hasn't been reading his briefing books, and the pros have been avoiding talking to him about sensitive sources and methods, so he may not have all that much useful intelligence to trade for his dacha on the Black Sea.  

If anything, the hearings (what I saw of them) made Peter Strzok into a hero. Credible.  Calm in the face of insults and stupidity.  Clear about what he could, and could not, talk about in an open hearing.  He came across as a professional counterintelligence agent.  He sort of reminded me of my Dad (and that's rare praise).  

But there was one statement he made in the hearing that caught my attention. Actually, it pulled me out of my chair. And since I don't see anyone else making this connection, I guess I will.  Strzok (with permission, I'm sure) pulled the curtain aside just a little bit on the early stages of the Trump-Russia investigation.  This is what grabbed my attention:

The information we had which was alleging a Russian offer of assistance to a member of the Trump campaign was of extraordinary significance. It was credible. It was from an extraordinarily sensitive and credible source.

What, exactly, does that mean?  "Intel-speak" tends to avoid exaggeration.  If anything, it tends to be overcautious.  Peter Strzok was a senior counterintelligence official, with years of experience in investigating, disrupting, and prosecuting Russian intelligence operations in the United States.  His record is exemplary.  He was, in fact, one of the first of a handful of people who knew what the FBI knew about Trump-Russia.  He could have, with a few words, undermined the Trump campaign.  He didn't do it.  The best available evidence is that he didn't even think of doing it.  He is that kind of professional.  Which means that every word he uses in an official capacity is considered.  Every word means something--no more, no less.

So what, exactly, was he saying?  It's been decades since I had any special access, but the meanings of some words were drummed into my head.  Most of the politicians probably missed it--exaggeration and spin are their stock in trade.  But, to me, it was like he stood on the desk with a bullhorn.  

The use of verbal probability estimates in National Intelligence Estimates has changed over time (for an overview of word counts see the MA thesis of Rachel Kesselman (Mercyhurst, 2008)).  But this is about the usual: it comes from a (now declassified) 2007 NIE.

Estimates of likelihood.  Because analytical judgments are not certain, we use probabilistic language...  Terms such as probably, likely, very likely, or almost certainly indicate a greater than even chance.

A chart of the continuum provided in the NIE makes it clear that probably or likely is around a sixty or seventy-five percent estimate of likelihood. Very likely is around eighty to ninety percent.  Almost certainly is over ninety percent.  There is no such thing as a certain assessment (100 percent)--there is always room for error.  But if you have to bet, likely is good enough to bet your money, very likely is good enough to bet your job, and almost certainly is good enough to bet your life.  

One can also chart the confidence in assessments, which is based on the quality, scope, and sourcing of the evidence on which the estimate is based.  A high confidence is an indication of high-quality information.  It's not certain, but it's damn near close.  Moderate confidence means the information comes from a credible source.  It's plausible.  Low confidence means there are questions about the source's credibility or plausibility.  It's possible, but you wouldn't want to base your decision on it.  Curveball, the Iraqi source passed along by German intelligence to the US, was in the judgement of the Germans a low confidence source.  The Americans chose to trust him because he fit the prejudices of senior administration officials, which led (in part) to the Iraq War of 2003.

So let's take another look at the testimony.  Strzok tells us the source was extraordinarily sensitive and credible.  This is the level of having a loyal agent inside the other side's agency--an agent with access to information most other insiders would not have.  This is a source so important, so sensitive, that to even release his report into normal channels (let alone to the public) would lead to an immediate manhunt, his discovery, torture, and execution.

No wonder Strzok kept his mouth shut!

And no wonder, once the Trump-Russia story began to surface through other channels, we began to see a series of murders of people in Russia who might have had some involvement in the operation.  This is not just about the "Steele Dossier".  Steele is a good spy, using the sources available to him outside of Russia, and it looks like he did a pretty good job.  But Strzok had his source before seeing anything from Steele.  And Strzok's source was someone with inside knowledge.  If not inner circle, then pretty damn close.

And Strzok is telling us he knew--perhaps not well enough to prove in an American court, but well enough that he would have been willing to bet his life and the lives of the people he cares about--he knew the Russians were openly offering assistance to at least one member of the Trump campaign.  And if it was happening at all, it was an operation planned and approved at the top.  The top of the Russian government--certainly.  The top of the Trump campaign?  That was something that deserved a much closer look.

***

OBE--Overtaken by Events--the news has broken that the Mueller team has indicted a number of senior Russian military intelligence officials for breaking into DNC servers, precisely when Donald Trump was calling on them, publicly, to do something like that.  Interesting.  I have to admire the timing.  I have to wonder--did the FBI officials who authorized Strzok to open the curtain, just a little, know this was coming today?

North Korea: Risking the Nation to Preserve the Regime

Satellite picture displaying the Korean peninsula at night. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

It seems our friends from North Korea are at it again.  Only this time the threats are noticeably more shrill, the propaganda noticeably more clumsy, the moves noticeably more blatant, the insanity - if such a thing is possible - more insane.  What's going on here?

Let's start with McIntosh's three rules for understanding foreign policy.  They don't cover everything.  They are too vague, in and of themselves, to make strong predictions.  They are probabilistic.  Yet I'd argue that all of those "bugs" are in fact "features": they provide a structure for analysis without creating a false sense of certainty.  What are they, and how do they apply?

RULE ONE: WHAT PEOPLE DO IS DETERMINIMED BY WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE REAL.

This includes not only perceptions of the physical conditions, but perceptions of how others see themselves and how they see the world and how will react, and even perceptions of one's own identity and reactions to hypothetical circumstances.  Is nuclear deterrence a bluff?  I don't know, and neither do you, and we won't know if it's a failure until it fails.

How does this apply here?  North Korea, under the new kid, is trying to create a perception of itself as more powerful and less frightened than most people (myself included) beleive it to be.  At the same time, there are indications that the regime of Kim Jong Un is not firmly entrenched in power.  There are rumors of attempted coups.  There are mobilizations of not only the military, but the people, that go beyond the norm for this time of year.  The regime is locking down the people, even more than usual, and locking the military to their posts, and justifying it by ratcheting up the Fear.  Many of the threats to the West and South sound like little more than propaganda in praise of the Great Leader, the Military Genius, the Only Man Who Can Bring Us Out of the Hell, that he, himself, has done so much to promote.

RULE TWO: WHAT IS REAL DETERMINES WHAT WORKS.

Unfortunately, we only approach reality by testing it.  As a first approximation, we coud say Reality is what surprises us - for good or for ill.  Kim Jong Un is testing the reality of the tense standoff on the Korean peninsula.  There's some indication that what he wants (beyond the usual foreign aid) is recognition and the long-postponed peace treaty that ends the War, preferably on terms favorable to the North.  I doubt he thinks the South will surrender (my perception, remember), but he might think that a formal recognition of the border and the end to the war will serve to consolidate his hold on power.  He would have taken a risky move that would have delivered what his father and grandfather were never able to achieve.  But the only way to know if he can get it is to push.  And now, having pushed, he has no clear way to draw back.

If his position is as precarious as some observers believe, pulling back now could, unless it was was coupled with concessions to military and political elites that he can't afford to make, bring about his fall, and the fall of his family.  Gods aren't allowed to fail - at least not in ways that can't be spun into "victory" by the propagandists.

Meanwhile, the threats - not just the public statements but the doctored photos and the blackboards with strike plans hitting Texas - clearly don't match the technical capabilities.  North Korea can, and may, launch a skirmishing strike to establish its resolve, but it just doesn't have what it takes to fight a war with the US, or a South Korea with US backing.  The people at the top know this.  Either they've convinced themselves the US wouldn't support the South, or it's about the domestic agenda.

RULE THREE: LEADERS ACT TO KEEP AND EXPAND POWER.

Again, there are some exceptions, on some dimensions.  But they are damn few.  And when leaders do seem to be leaving their formal position, they do everything they can to maintain their policies, put their hand-picked successors in the job, and maintain a secure "retirement."  One the great things about a republic is it formalizes the transition, regularizes it, and allows departing leaders the confidence they won't be prosecuted for their crimes.  (And yes, this includes the US, and it factors into how Obama refused to prosecute Bush officials and assumes he can get away with his own policies.  Obama is to Bush as Ford is to Nixon.)  North Korea has nothing like that.  Kim Jong Un can lose everything, and he knows it.  Thus the gamble, and thus the trap.  His weakness makes him belligerent.  His failure makes it worse.

And what if he does fail?  Best case, in the short run, might be a palace coup.  The Great Leader dies is a tragic accident, and another member of the family fills in as figurehead while the elites bargain over the spoils.  A middle case could be civil war, and a failed state.  A failed nuclear North Korea is something mobody wants to think about, and everyone has to.  A worst case could be war, triggered bu accident, or miscalulation, or madness.  Or maybe he'll find a way to back down without looking like he's backing down.  The the US and South Korea are scheduled to end their exercises soon.  A big party is scheduled for the departed Kim Il Sung in the middle next month. The Great Leader of today declares victory, telling everyone how he drove away the Americans.  Most don't know any better, and those who do get enough of a payoff from the status quo to be happy to return to it.  It looks like Kim Jong Un is risking his nation in order to consolidate his personal power.  The interests of the State are not the same as the interests of the people, and the interests of the Leader are not necessarily the interests of the State. As a result, the uncertainties are real, and dangerous.

Probabilities, anyone?

Other options?

North Korea: timeline of escalating threats - Telegraph

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Criminal or incompetent?

Cover of George W. Bush

Eleven years after 9/11, it seems the real core of the argument about the truth of 9/11, one that all so often descends into technical minutia and mutual name-calling, really boils down to competing images of the roles and capabilities of government.  Paul Craig Roberts, an intelligent critic of the conventional 9/11 story, does a good job of highlighting the differences.  As he describes it the options are that elements of the government, or elements of several governments, are either VERY competent at managing and hiding a false-flag operation, or those elements are VERY incompetent to the point of multiple simultaneous failures.

In order to understand the improbability of the government’s explanation of 9/11, it is not necessary to know anything about what force or forces brought down the three World Trade Center buildings, what hit the Pentagon or caused the explosion, the flying skills or lack thereof of the alleged hijackers, whether the airliner crashed in Pennsylvania or was shot down, whether cell phone calls made at the altitudes could be received, or any other debated aspect of the controversy. 

You only have to know two things. 

One is that according to the official story, a handful of Arabs, mainly Saudi Arabians, operating independently of any government and competent intelligence service, men without James Bond and V for Vendetta capabilities, outwitted not only the CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency, but all 16 US intelligence agencies, along with all security agencies of America’s NATO allies and Israel’s Mossad. Not only did the entire intelligence forces of the Western world fail, but on the morning of the attack the entire apparatus of the National Security State simultaneously failed. Airport security failed four times in one hour. NORAD failed. Air Traffic Control failed. The US Air Force failed. The National Security Council failed. Dick Cheney failed. Absolutely nothing worked. The world’s only superpower was helpless at the humiliating mercy of a few undistinguished Arabs.

I'll ignore the implicit racism in describing the hijackers as "a few undistinguished Arabs."  His main point is he finds it easier to believe in superior villains than in spectacular fools.  I disagree.  This is not to say that I disagree with the idea that conspiracies operate in the world.  Of course they do.  What I find hard to accept is they are that good at it.  My personal experience with government at all levels is that, along with other organizations, it often magnifies the failures of the people in it.  People in power don't believe what they don't want to believe.  Bureaucracies fail to perceive things that fall outside of their areas of expertise.  Those who do put the clues together will find themselves marginalized and ignored, or even punished.  And what happens next?

It is hard to imagine a more far-fetched story–except for the second thing you need to know: The humiliating failure of US National Security did not result in immediate demands from the President of the United States, from Congress, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and from the media for an investigation of how such improbable total failure could have occurred. No one was held accountable for the greatest failure of national security in world history. Instead, the White House dragged its feet for a year resisting any investigation until the persistent demands from 9/11 families for accountability forced President George W. Bush to appoint a political commission, devoid of any experts, to hold a pretend investigation.

This is supposed to be a surprise?  When organization and governments screw up--totally, completely, and from the top down--they circle the wagons, look for excuses, punish scapegoats, derail investigations, do whatever they can to cover the asses of those most responsible for the failure.  This is not a surprise.  An exception to this pattern would be a surprise.

What shocks me about so much of the "9/11 truth" critique is not the idea that there could be duplicity in government, or among other elites.  What amazes me is they have so much faith that so many, so powerful, could be so good at it, and so consistently.  They believe in the state, even as they criticize particular people in it.  They believe that if the state fails, there must be a sinister agenda, because at heart the state is too good and too competent to stumble as it did.  Personally, I don't buy it.  I don't buy the official story--there's no reason to assume that any official story is the truth--but if the only choice is between human fools and perfect villains, I find it easier to believe in fools.

The 11th Anniversary of 9/11 ~ Paul Craig Roberts - PaulCraigRoberts.org

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Stuxnet and Flame

Depiction of a compartmented "Behind the Green Door" US secure communications center (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Cyberwarfare is getting interesting, and not just because of what it means for "traditional" international relations.  Increasingly, it looks like anyone can run a serious cyber-espionage operation.  How long until these tools are in the hands of more non-state actors?  When do they become a major tool in domestic politics?  IntelNews reviews the situation.  Excerpts:

Stuxnet, which caused unprecedented waves of panic among Iranian cybersecurity experts, was 500 kilobytes in size. Flame is over 20 megabytes in size, consisting of 650,000 lines of code; it is so complex that it is expected to take programming analysts around a decade to fully comprehend. The two are different, of course. Stuxnet was an infrastructure-sabotaging malware, which destroyed hundreds —maybe even thousands—of Iranian nuclear centrifuges. Flame, on the other hand, appears to be an espionage tool: it aims to surreptitiously collect information from infected systems.

Both, of course, were directed against Iran.  But they don't end there.

...there is no little doubt that Flame’s handlers have collected massive amounts of intelligence for at least two years. The program was apparently able to record conversations conducted over Skype; take desktop snapshots every 15 seconds or so; and collect usernames and passwords, among other capabilities. And all that while circumventing even the strongest antivirus software. But there is also the other side of the equation: as in the case of Stuxnet, Flame is now effectively freeware. Anyone can ostensibly access it, copy it, modify it, and re-launch it against his or her target of choice...

Cover via Amazon

Over 100 Israeli systems are already reported to have been infected by Flame, as well as systems in several other countries in the region.  The United States?  I have found no conclusive reports one way or another.  And even then, we'd have to distinguish between government and corporate and other systems.  But the "freeware" aspect intrigues me.  How much trouble would it be for the next PFC Manning to insert a version of Flame into SIPRNet?  Or something more restricted?  I can't help but wonder how many cyberactivsts are pouring over the code.

Are we approaching the land of "No More Secrets"?  Is this The Transparent Society discussed by Brin?  Not really, if only for the reason that those who uncover secrets may not be able to understand what they have, or may choose not to share it with the world.  But it does raise the prospect that while the NSA plugs away at monitoring everything we do, there might be a lot more states and non-state actors doing the same to them.  How will that change the game?

Comment: Who authored computer virus that ‘dwarfs Stuxnet’? « intelNews.org

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The Iranians are rational

At least as much as most people.

(And probably more than some of the Republican presidential candidates, if we are to judge them by their rhetoric.)

First of all, the "Iranians" are not a monolithic group, any more than "Americans" or "Israelis" or "Muslims" or "Science Fiction Geeks."  The fact that so many commentators seem to present them as speaking with a single voice is suspicious in itself.

Image via Wikipedia

Second, not all voices are equally authoritative.  President Ahmadinejad, despite the title, is no where near the summit of Iranian power.  I'd put him around number thirteen (or less) on a list of politically influential Iranians.  If you want to talk to the real power, find Ayatollah Khamenei.  And his statements are a lot less scary.  In 2009 the supreme leader said

They falsely accuse the Islamic republic’s establishment of producing nuclear weapons. We fundamentally reject nuclear weapons and prohibit the use and production of nuclear weapons. This is because of our ideology, not because of politics or fear of arrogant powers or an onslaught of international propaganda. We stand firm for our ideology.

So what--that was 2009.  How about 2010?

We have said repeatedly that our religious beliefs and principles prohibit such weapons as they are the symbol of destruction of generations. And for this reason we do not believe in weapons and atomic bombs and do not seek them.

Ok, ok.  But that was still years ago. How about last month?

The Iranian nation has never pursued and will never pursue nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the decision makers in the countries opposing us know well that Iran is not after nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic, logically, religiously and theoretically, considers the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin and believes the proliferation of such weapons is senseless, destructive and dangerous.

Does this sound like madness? 

So how do we make sense of the Iranian program?  In part, it may be just what they say it is, a program to develop their energy infrastructure.  The fact that they can be harmed by an embargo on gasoline sales (the Iranians have little ability to refine their own oil) is reason enough to persue this.  Besides, they know better than most what their future oil production is likely to be, and what the global market will look like.

Do I buy that?  Not entirely.  I suspect they want the ability to produce a bomb quickly, as a deterrent, without actually producing or deploying the weapons that might trigger Israeli premption. And it's not just me, sitting in Pennsylvania.  More and more Israelis are willing to come out with a similar view.  Mier Dagan, the head of the Mossad for eight years, has described the regime in Iran, including Ahmadinajad, as "a very rational regime."  The fact that he talks in public at all is impressive.  That he came out to say that is remarkable.

So why the drum-beats for war?  Is it simply the obsessions of Netanyahu and some personalities?  American campaign rhetoric?  A chance to manipulate oil prices?  Or to sell advanced weapons?  To be sure, these are governments that are not going to be friends any time soon. Khamenei still refers to Israel as a "cancerous tumor."  All of this is probably part of what's going on, but in the final analysis it doesn't matter: the picture of the Iranians and the Iranian program does not reflect reality, and a policy based on those illusions is an invitation to failure.  Maybe catastrophic failure.

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Paging Jason Bourne

Image via Wikipedia

Every so often the curtain parts and one sees the world is a lot more like a spy movie than most people want to believe. Memos have leaked from the the CIA describing a "false flag" operation by the Israelis, directed against Iran, in which an anti-Iranian terrorist group was told they were being sponsored by the Americans. In this world, you can never be entirely sure who you are working for, or with. And once discovered (during W's administration), what was the reaction?

The CIA memos of the incident have been "blue bordered," meaning that they were circulated to senior levels of the broader U.S. intelligence community as well as senior State Department officials.

What has become crystal clear, however, is the level of anger among senior intelligence officials about Israel's actions. "This was stupid and dangerous," the intelligence official who first told me about the operation said. "Israel is supposed to be working with us, not against us. If they want to shed blood, it would help a lot if it was their blood and not ours. You know, they're supposed to be a strategic asset. Well guess what? There are a lot of people now, important people, who just don't think that's true."

False Flag - By Mark Perry | Foreign Policy

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STRATFOR hacked by Anonymous--and so was I

I have a grudging admiration for anonymous, the "non-group" of people using their hacking skills not to make a profit, but to bring political and social change.  I've commented on them in the past.  They were a case study of "gray area" and "non-hierarchical" actors in my class last semester on Terrorism.  And while I think it's safe to call what they do cyber-crime, I don't see any real terrorist intent.  More like a robin hood complex.

So imagine my surprise to learn I had been targeted by them (or by somebody using their name--that's the problem with non-groups with anonymous membership.  Hell, *I* might be a member...).  A few years ago I was a paid subscriber to STRATFOR, a private intelligence service.  I'm still on their mailing list, reading the free newsletters and receiving offers to rejoin.  STRATFOR's subscriber list is now on line, complete with names, email addresses, and the password used by that subscriber.  And, apparently, the credit card numbers are available, too.  Including mine.

(And no, I won't link to any of it it.  You can find it for yourself, no doubt.)

In addition to providing a "who's-who" of government, corporate, and academic intel types (an interesting list, by the way--I should remember to save a copy for myself), anonymous threatens to use the numbers and passwords to make contributions to charities of their choice in the names of STRATFOR subscribers (robin hoods, remember?) and break into the files of those subscribers elsewhere.

I don't think I'm in any particular trouble.  Not only am I not worth targeting, the information they have on me is old.  I dropped that credit card years ago, and changed the number on my debit card a few weeks ago.  I've regularly updated my passwords everywhere several time since I was a paid member, and the STRATFOR password opens nothing.  All they really have is an email address, and that's public knowledge already.  But it's an interesting experience.  And I'm glad I decided, all those years ago, that a personal subscription to STRATFOR wasn't worth the cost.

Oh, and if you are from anonymous and reading this--no hard feelings.