This conflict is a prolonged irregular campaign, a violent struggle for legitimacyIt's 23 pages, and it's very general. That 's just the nature of the NDS. It's still worth a look.
and influence over the population. The use of force plays a role, yet military
efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to
promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur
development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often
lie at the heart of insurgencies. For these reasons, arguably the most important
military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we
do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern
themselves.
03 August, 2008
National Defense Strategy
28 July, 2008
Reputation in international politics
A quick review of recent literature:
Reputation does appear to affect alliance behavior. A strong reputation for sticking with past alliances affects alliance formation and dispute resolution. (1)
Crisis behavior is less clear. Failed (or successful) crisis deterrence, for example, doesn’t seem to matter as much as is commonly assumed in the literature in strategic signaling. In fact, the effect of past action (standing firm, or backing down) on reputation seems to be pretty low. (2)
Some of the most interesting work is being done of the expected domestic consequences of backing down, and what effects that has on foreign policy. In democracies, regardless of whether or not reputation has a strong effect on foreign leaders, the belief by key domestic audiences that it does, and the expectation by a democratic leader that he would suffer politically if he were seen to back down, does seem to lead to a stiffening of the spine by that leader. (Consider JFK’s comment on Cuba, that if he let the provocation slide he’d be impeached.) (3)
When it comes to deterrence (of various kinds), there have been few studies of the effect of reputation. Those that have been done find “little support for the strong-interdependence-of-commitment argument that potential attackers infer the defender’s reputation for resolve from its prior behavior in disputes with other states across a broad range of geographic locations.” (4) It’s not that reputation is insignificant, but its significance is very context-dependent, and situational variables are consistently more important. It also appears that “lessons learned” don’t stick for very long, as the strategic situation changes and/or leaders are replaced. The middle east--especially the Arab-Israeli dispute--is a good example of this.
(1) Gibler, Thomas M. The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation. Journal of Conflict Resolution; Jun2008, Vol. 52 Issue 3, p426-454.
(2) Danilovic, Vesna, and Joe Clare. Reputational Effects of International Conflicts. Conference Papers — International Studies Association; 2007 Annual Meeting.
(3) Tomz, Michael. Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. International Organization; Fall2007, Vol. 61 Issue 4, p821-840.
(4) Huth, Paul K. Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 1999. 2:2548. Huth is probably the leading researcher in this area. He's certainly one of the best.
Deja vu
Obama = Woodrow Wilson (clearly a role model)
McCain = Theodore Roosevelt (McCain has called himself a TR Republican)
Barr = Eugene Debbs (libertarian or socialist, the radical alternative)
Bush = William Howard Taft (?)
The biggest difference is that Bush is not allowed to run for reelection.
23 July, 2008
Defining victory
McCain:
I know what this conflict is all about. I will bring our troops home. I will bring them home in victory. I will not do what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said would be very dangerous. We will have a stable Iraq that we won't have to return to because we have succeeded in the strategy and we will come home with victory and honor and not in defeat. Sen. Obama has said that if the surge failed that he might have to send troops back. After this surge has succeeded and we’ve won a victory, we’ll never have to send Americans back.Obama:
What happens is that if we continue to put $10 billion to $12 billion a month into Iraq, if we are willing to send as many troops as we can muster continually into Iraq? There's no doubt that that's gonna have an impact. But it doesn't meet our long-term strategic goal, which is to make the American people safer over the long term. If that means that we're detracting from our efforts in Afghanistan, where conditions are deteriorating, if it means that we are distracted from going after Osama bin Laden who is still sending out audio tapes and is operating training camps where we know terrorists' actions are being plotted.There seems to be a major difference in focus, as well as assumptions. I hope McCain has a more broad concept of victory than the one he articulates here, because what he's calling for isn't strategic victory, it's operational. Operational victory on the wrong front can be worse than irrelevant. It would be as if the US fought World War II by invading Brazil. Even if you win there, it doesn't really matter.
If we have shifted away from the central front of terrorism as a consequence of enormous and continuing investments in Iraq, then that's a poor strategic choice. And ultimately, what we've got to do is - we have to recognize that Iraq is just one of our … security problems. It's not the only one.
McCain seems to be assuming Iraq is the center of gravity, the necessary battle if one is to win the war (or at least not lose it). Obama seems to be assuming Iraq is peripheral.
So which is right? I'm fairly certain that Iraq was peripheral in 2001, and in 2003. The American commitment made Iraq more important, and it encouraged a transfer of enemy resources to that front. If and when the US shifts to another front, some of those enemy resources will follow. I don't care much about perceptions of "American resolve," because those can be influenced by other means, and they aren't all that important in the long-term calculations of most opponents anyway. It's a poor bet to assume another state will be so internally fragmented that it will refuse to use its capabilities. And while some people will make that bet (Saddam Hussein comes to mind), most will apply some kind of worse-case assumption.
If it is American choices that have increased Iraq's importance, other choices can reduce it. I suspect that two years after most combat troops are out of Iraq--however it is accomplished--the country will not be considered important enough to go back in with a similar force, no matter what happens there.
Nonproliferation
It's time to accept that the current nonproliferation system is pretty much damaged beyond repair. From the start it was based on a division of the world into two classes of states, with a compact between them Neither of those points are entirely valid now. The problem is a lack of consensus regarding what to do next.
18 July, 2008
The erosion of rights
Some people seemed surprised by how long the process eroding our rights has been going on, and many were surprised by just how far it has already gone. The complicity of the courts is eye-opening, too. Consider the most recent ruling on "enemy combatants," the Al-Marri decision. A longer review, from Glenn Greenwald, is here. But lets just look at what the panel of judges of the Fourth Circuit Court put into the text of their opinions. Everyone accepts that


In the words of the majority opinion, this didn't matter.
What matters is whether the President labels one an "enemy combatant." Attach that label, and you can can be placed in detention (in al-Marri's case, solitary confinement) for years. Hell, the government can lock you up forever.So what, you ask? He's probably guilty of something? Besides, he's not even a citizen. Actual guilt and citizenship have nothing to do with the precedent. In the words of another judge on the court,
And that means
Sleep well, America.
Sad news
14 July, 2008
Obama on foreign policy
Oil: how bad can it get?
How bad can things get? The New Scientist (28 June) reports on a 2005 simulation of a hypothetical oil shock. The article is subscription only, but interesting commentary on it can be found here. An excerpt:
According to the New Scientist report, “In 2005, a group of current and former US government and national security officials were asked to address [the question of a large-scale supply interruption] in a live role-play exercise.” Teaming Shell Oil, counter-terrorism specialists and industry analysts, the simulation explored the possibility of a mounting compound disruption of supplies. Over the course of the 2005 simulation, the price of a barrel of crude reached $123.
“Against the recent peak price of $139, that rise would take the cost per barrel to $295,” reports Ian Sample for the New Scientist. Speculation due to the dim security outlook would then push the price to $161, which translates to $341.69 when accounting for current prices. Former CIA chief James Woolsey, one of the simulation participants said the scenario explored was “relatively mild compared to what is possible”.
Which is one of the reasons Woolsey drives a Prius (and so do I). He also uses solar power and biofuels, and as the initial capital expenditure drops, solar is looking better and better to me, too. I'm counting the months until we see a practical electric/plug-in hybrid on the market.