Showing posts with label war. Show all posts
Showing posts with label war. Show all posts

27 December, 2017

Dead Hand

Remember Dr. Strangelove?  For those of you too young to get the reference, "Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb" was a black comedy by Stanley Kubrick released a couple of years after the Cuban Missile Crisis.  It described an accidental attack on the the Soviet Union, which triggered an automatic response, which essentially destroyed the world (except, maybe, for a few top leaders and their harems, deep underground).  Much of the dialogue could have been taken directly from a couple of the leading books of the day: Herman Kahn's On Thermonclear War, and Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.

Kubrick tried to make the movie look very accurate, and for the most part he succeeded (the "War Room" was designed for drama, not for accuracy). His story tried to take the ideas of the nuclear strategists to their logical conclusions. Since the people he was condemning were already trying to push their ideas to their logical conclusions, there wasn't much farther to go.  One of the devices he mentioned, from a thought experiment, was the "Doomsday Machine"--an automated system that would, when certain conditions were met, launch an  overwhelming strike against the projected enemy without any human involvement whatever.  In fact, it was designed so it couldn't be turned off.  Once activated, the threat was automatic, unlimited, and unstoppable.

What nobody realized for years is the Russians really built the damn thing.  For all we know it's still there.  The "Perimeter" system, also known as "Dead Hand" would (does) monitor for evidence of a nuclear strike, check that it was out of touch with higher authorities, and unlock a key that would enable an officer on duty (the only human in the loop, told that everything he ever loved was dead) to launch the counterstrike (or first strike, if the system glitched).

A big question, even addressed in Dr. Strangelove, is if this is meant to be the ultimate deterrent "why would you keep it a secret?"  In the movie it had just been activated, and it was to be announced at the next Party conference.  In reality, the Russians never mentioned it.  Today, they avoid talking about it.  The Americans never knew it was there.  And we still don't know if if it is, or is not, active today.

The more I learn about the Cold War, the more amazed I am we are still alive.  And stories like these lead me to wonder if we can keep it that way.

Inside the Apocalyptic Soviet Doomsday Machine | WIRED

31 March, 2013

North Korea: Risking the Nation to Preserve the Regime

Satellite picture displaying the Korean penins...
Satellite picture displaying the Korean peninsula at night. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
It seems our friends from North Korea are at it again.  Only this time the threats are noticeably more shrill, the propaganda noticeably more clumsy, the moves noticeably more blatant, the insanity - if such a thing is possible - more insane.  What's going on here?

Let's start with McIntosh's three rules for understanding foreign policy.  They don't cover everything.  They are too vague, in and of themselves, to make strong predictions.  They are probabilistic.  Yet I'd argue that all of those "bugs" are in fact "features": they provide a structure for analysis without creating a false sense of certainty.  What are they, and how do they apply?

RULE ONE: WHAT PEOPLE DO IS DETERMINIMED BY WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE REAL.

This includes not only perceptions of the physical conditions, but perceptions of how others see themselves and how they see the world and how will react, and even perceptions of one's own identity and reactions to hypothetical circumstances.  Is nuclear deterrence a bluff?  I don't know, and neither do you, and we won't know if it's a failure until it fails.

How does this apply here?  North Korea, under the new kid, is trying to create a perception of itself as more powerful and less frightened than most people (myself included) beleive it to be.  At the same time, there are indications that the regime of Kim Jong Un is not firmly entrenched in power.  There are rumors of attempted coups.  There are mobilizations of not only the military, but the people, that go beyond the norm for this time of year.  The regime is locking down the people, even more than usual, and locking the military to their posts, and justifying it by ratcheting up the Fear.  Many of the threats to the West and South sound like little more than propaganda in praise of the Great Leader, the Military Genius, the Only Man Who Can Bring Us Out of the Hell, that he, himself, has done so much to promote.

RULE TWO: WHAT IS REAL DETERMINES WHAT WORKS.

Unfortunately, we only approach reality by testing it.  As a first approximation, we coud say Reality is what surprises us - for good or for ill.  Kim Jong Un is testing the reality of the tense standoff on the Korean peninsula.  There's some indication that what he wants (beyond the usual foreign aid) is recognition and the long-postponed peace treaty that ends the War, preferably on terms favorable to the North.  I doubt he thinks the South will surrender (my perception, remember), but he might think that a formal recognition of the border and the end to the war will serve to consolidate his hold on power.  He would have taken a risky move that would have delivered what his father and grandfather were never able to achieve.  But the only way to know if he can get it is to push.  And now, having pushed, he has no clear way to draw back.

If his position is as precarious as some observers believe, pulling back now could, unless it was was coupled with concessions to military and political elites that he can't afford to make, bring about his fall, and the fall of his family.  Gods aren't allowed to fail - at least not in ways that can't be spun into "victory" by the propagandists.

Meanwhile, the threats - not just the public statements but the doctored photos and the blackboards with strike plans hitting Texas - clearly don't match the technical capabilities.  North Korea can, and may, launch a skirmishing strike to establish its resolve, but it just doesn't have what it takes to fight a war with the US, or a South Korea with US backing.  The people at the top know this.  Either they've convinced themselves the US wouldn't support the South, or it's about the domestic agenda.

RULE THREE: LEADERS ACT TO KEEP AND EXPAND POWER.

Again, there are some exceptions, on some dimensions.  But they are damn few.  And when leaders do seem to be leaving their formal position, they do everything they can to maintain their policies, put their hand-picked successors in the job, and maintain a secure "retirement."  One the great things about a republic is it formalizes the transition, regularizes it, and allows departing leaders the confidence they won't be prosecuted for their crimes.  (And yes, this includes the US, and it factors into how Obama refused to prosecute Bush officials and assumes he can get away with his own policies.  Obama is to Bush as Ford is to Nixon.)  North Korea has nothing like that.  Kim Jong Un can lose everything, and he knows it.  Thus the gamble, and thus the trap.  His weakness makes him belligerent.  His failure makes it worse.

And what if he does fail?  Best case, in the short run, might be a palace coup.  The Great Leader dies is a tragic accident, and another member of the family fills in as figurehead while the elites bargain over the spoils.  A middle case could be civil war, and a failed state.  A failed nuclear North Korea is something mobody wants to think about, and everyone has to.  A worst case could be war, triggered bu accident, or miscalulation, or madness.  Or maybe he'll find a way to back down without looking like he's backing down.  The the US and South Korea are scheduled to end their exercises soon.  A big party is scheduled for the departed Kim Il Sung in the middle next month. The Great Leader of today declares victory, telling everyone how he drove away the Americans.  Most don't know any better, and those who do get enough of a payoff from the status quo to be happy to return to it.  It looks like Kim Jong Un is risking his nation in order to consolidate his personal power.  The interests of the State are not the same as the interests of the people, and the interests of the Leader are not necessarily the interests of the State. As a result, the uncertainties are real, and dangerous.

Probabilities, anyone?

Other options?

North Korea: timeline of escalating threats - Telegraph
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14 March, 2013

"The Great Renewal"

Xi Jinping 习近平
Xi Jinping 习近平 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
Recent statements out of China point to some changes in how the Chinese view themselves, their role in the world, and their future.  Party Congresses are a time to reveal changes in doctrine, and the most recent Congress falls into the pattern. According to Xinhua on 13 March "The Chinese Dream" is the hot topic, and
"China's new Communist Party leader Xi Jinping said during a museum tour last November the Chinese dream meant for him the 'great renewal of the Chinese nation.' He has pledged to pursue the shared Chinese dream of national rejuvenation."
Nightwatch does its typically fine job of evaluating the changes: 
"The Chinese dream" is being introduced on the margins of the National People's Congress (NPC) as the new strategic concept that replaces "China's peaceful rise."
In practice, this means the recognition of an inflection point in China's progress to the status of a global power, from "rising power" to national renewal.  Xi's speech of March 11th to the PLA delegation to the People's Congress was described as one that

National emblem of the People's Republic of China
... scientifically answers a series of important questions, that is,why to strengthen the military under the new situation,what to be the goal of military strengthening,how to take the path of military strengthening with Chinese characteristics."

It declares that "effecting civil-military integrated development is an important way of realizing the integration of enriching the nation and strengthening the military," and "to build a military force of the people that obeys the party's orders, is able to win in war, and keeps a good behavioral style; fully and clearly understand that obeying the party's orders is the soul, being able to win in war is the core, keeping a good style is the guarantee."  Nightwatch sums up the changes:

The circular makes the point that there is a new situation. Xi has scientifically evaluated it as requiring integration of economic and military strength in order to fulfill The Chinese Dream. In The Chinese Dream concept, Xi explicitly connects economic growth with military modernization and links them to Chinese renewal. 
His speech is called a programmatic document which means that it is not cheerleading, but guidance. An intense study period for the entire armed forces is prescribed in order to explain the purpose and direction of a more rapid development of national defense and military modernization. 
In the 1990s, indoctrination about "fighting wars under modern conditions" disrupted normal armed forces training and reshaped the training that followed the indoctrination period. 
The new situation requires military obedience to the Party; the ability to win wars; and good behavior. Obedience to party orders and behaving well are longstanding issues in the PLA. The new requirement is "to win in war," which replaces, "fighting wars under modern conditions." 
In the circular the PLA was instructed that the PLA is expected to provide the "strong power guarantee" for national rejuvenation. 
This appears to portend a more muscular and militarily assertive China during the next five years at least. China remains committed to peace, but not at the expense of its national interests and claims. The pace of military modernization will quicken.
Maritime claims in the South China Sea
Maritime claims in the South China Sea (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

That seems to me to be a fair reading.  I'd only add a couple of points of my own.  The requirement "to win in war" not only strongly suggests that there will be a sizable increase in resources to the armed forces.  It implies that the wars that China may fight are, in fact, ones they can win.  It does not say that China wants war, or even that it expects war.  It does say, however, that war is possible - including, presumably, great-power war - and if it happens China can, and should, be prepared to win.  Furthermore, backed by that kind of power - at least on a regional scale, and perhaps globally - one should expect a more assertive foreign policy.  The sort of claims we've seen in the South China Sea, for example, are a foretaste of things to come.  And if others (read the US) believe a "show of force" will be sufficient to assure retreat they may be surprised.  Rising power, hegemonic retrenchment, plenty of room for miserception of capabilities and will.  This is not a formula for stability.

us1.campaign-archive2.com/?u=817f179ff76c12de2a4e5ba20&id=2d7a6870c0&e=cad5c8ba2d
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27 November, 2012

Baathism: An Obituary / The End Of An Ideology | The New Republic


Something to think about, as the slow collapse of Syria proceeds, is the ideas that created so many countries like it.  Like Communism, yet another God has failed.  But another one waits in the wings...
The bombed-out remains of the Baath Party Head...
The bombed-out remains of the Baath Party Headquarters in Baghdad. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The political and cultural landscape of the Middle East, post-Baath, will be pockmarked by blighted zones that might otherwise have been a prosperous Iraq and Syria, if only the Baathist doctrine had not destroyed those countries. A cloud of intellectual bafflement and paranoia will hover overhead, consisting of the confused thoughts of everyone across the region who, in the past, talked themselves into supposing that Baathism was a good idea. And more than visible will be the triumphant zeal of Baathism’s principal rivals in the matter of grandiose revolutionary ideology—the champions of the single Middle Eastern millenarian doctrine still standing, once the Assad regime has finally gone. These will be the Islamists.
How long till we get out of the millenerarian mindset?  A little humility can go a long way to making the world a much better place.  It's people with a direct line to the truth who too often turn into monsters.


Baathism: An Obituary / The End Of An Ideology | The New Republic

17 January, 2012

A small step in the right direction

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld shares a ...
Image via Wikipedia
I have a dream.

I have a dream where Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld and George Bush are in cages, tried for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and violations of the Bill of Rights.

I'd prefer to see it in an American court. I'd like to think we can police our own, and only an American court can handle Constitutional violations. But I'd be willing to accept handing them over to the International Criminal Court. Perhaps a combined trial with the remaining leadership of Al Qaeda.

If it's the best we can do, I'd even accept a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, similar to that after Apartheid in South Africa. At least then we could get the truth out, shame those who thought they cold hide their crimes, and build a consensus to never do it again.

Meanwhile, I have to settle for whatever small steps are made. One of these is a recent report by the World Organization for Human Rights and the Washington College of Law at American University. It's entitled INDEFENSIBLE: A Reference for Prosecuting Torture and Other Felonies Committed By U.S. Officials Following September 11th, and it does a solid job of starting to make the case for the prosecution. From the Table of Contents:
II. The Attorney General Has the Authority to Appoint Special Counsel to Investigate and, Where Warranted, Prosecute Crimes Committed by United States Government Officials.... 20
A. Department of Justice Regulations grant the Attorney General authority to appoint Special Counsel............................................................................. 20
B. The Attorney General also has the power to delegate broad authority to a special prosecutor pursuant to the U.S. Code. ........................................... 32
C. Where the subject matter of the investigation could raise serious conflict of interest issues pertaining to the DOJ, the DOJ regulations should be invoked as the appropriate source of authority for appointing Special Counsel ............. 36
III. The Orchestrated Effort by Former Top-Level Administration Officials to Implement a Detainee Interrogation Program Resulted in the Widespread, Systematic, and Unlawful Abuse and Torture of Detainees ......................... 38
A. High-ranking members of the Bush Administration issued policies or directives
authorizing detainee abuse ................................................................ 39
B. Senior-level U.S. government officials set out to create a legal framework that would justify the use of unlawful interrogation tactics against detainees.......... 48
C. The policies and directives issued by top U.S. government officials authorizing specific interrogation tactics were the direct cause of detainee torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment...................................................................82
IV. High-Ranking U.S. Government Officials Violated U.S. Domestic and International Law by Approving or Facilitating the Use of Torture and Other Forms of Human Rights ViolationsAgainst Terror Suspects ........................114
A. Top U.S. officials unlawfully conspired, facilitated, and directed the commission of torture and other human rights violations in violation of international law......................114
B. Top U.S. officials may also be held criminally accountable for contributing to, or conspiring to commit, crimes in violation of other U.S. federal criminal laws ...................... 117
C. Bush Administration officials conspired to violate the Torture Act by agreeing to, forming, and implementing policies and procedures detailing and recommending acts violating the Torture Act ........................................... 140
D. Officials who have either aided, commanded, or counseled for the commission of felonies, or who conspired to do the same, may be prosecuted in U.S. courts under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 18 U.S.C. § 371 ...................................... 156
E. No legal defense may be raised that would preclude investigation or prosecution of individuals who approved or facilitated the commission of torture ..................................... 228
V. Conclusion....................................................240
Maybe I'll use this for my UN and Law class. Have them try the case?

People's Blog for the Constitution » Report calls for prosecution of top government officials for acts of torture

31 December, 2011

What if WWIII had hapened?

I wrote my dissertation on nuclear war planning.  This stuff has always held a fascination for me.  With the passage of time, we now know more about what kind of world the leaders expected they would see when it all went down.

The British have released the 1962 Cabinet Office War Book, including the password to activate the secret bunker that would hold the key 230 politicians and bureaucrats responsible for picking up the pieces.

The code word, by the way, was "orangeade."  Just in case you ever need to know.

Meanwhile, courtesy of FEMA, the NRDC, and War News Updates we have this estimate of the targets to be struck in the US in the event of nuclear war.

Thank God that didn't happen.  Pray it never will.

An adult at the table

There remains hope that the people who actually have an understanding of the situation will restrain the politicians.  It's hard to dismiss the current and past heads of the Mossad as "anti-Israel" or "soft on defense."  

A nuclear-armed Iran wouldn't necessarily constitute a threat to Israel's continued existence, Mossad chief Tamir Pardo reportedly hinted earlier this week.
***
On Tuesday evening, Pardo addressed an audience of about 100 Israeli ambassadors. According to three ambassadors present at the briefing, the intelligence chief said that Israel was using various means to foil Iran's nuclear program and would continue to do so, but if Iran actually obtained nuclear weapons, it would not mean the destruction of the State of Israel.
 
The ambassadors said Pardo did not comment on the possibility of an Israeli military assault on Iran."What is the significance of the term existential threat?" the ambassadors quoted Pardo as asking. "Does Iran pose a threat to Israel? Absolutely. But if one said a nuclear bomb in Iranian hands was an existential threat, that would mean that we would have to close up shop and go home. That's not the situation. The term existential threat is used too freely." 
"But what was clearly implied by his remarks is that he doesn't think a nuclear Iran is an existential threat to Israel," one of the envoys said. 
For the past several years, Netanyahu has characterized a nuclear Iran as an existential threat to Israel. The prime minister has even compared Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Adolf Hitler and argued that Iran should be treated as Nazi Germany should have been dealt with in 1938, just before World War II. In contrast, Barak said in April 2010 that Iran "was not an existential threat at the moment," but warned that it could become one in the future.Pardo's remarks follow lively a public debate in recent months over a possible Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. One of the figures at the center of this public debate has been Pardo's predecessor as Mossad chief, Meir Dagan. Dagan has argued that Israel should only resort to military force "when the knife is at its throat and begins to cut into the flesh." He has also criticized Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, accusing them of pushing for an Israeli attack on Iran, and warned that such an assault would have disastrous consequences. 
In the cabinet, Netanyahu and Barak have been the leading proponents of a preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. So far, however, they have not managed to convince a majority of either the "octet" forum of eight senior ministers or the diplomatic-security cabinet to support their position.
Otto von Bismarck, master of Realpolitik, probably said it best: "Preemptive war is like committing suicide for fear of death."

22 December, 2011

A lesson for analysts

From the December 15th edition of Nightwatch, one of the best sources on current events:

NightWatchFor the night of 15 December 2011 
Administrative note: NightWatch will not be published this night in honor of the official end of the US intervention in Iraq. Now Iraq can rediscover a new Arab normality and identity. 
Lesson for new analysts: Whenever a senior official of any government feels the need to assert in public that a nine-year military commitment was worth it, that assessment obviously is not self-evident.

I have nothing to add.

19 December, 2011

Well, *that* didn't take long...

One day after the US forces officially leave Iraq,

Nuri al-Maliki plunged Iraq into political turmoi by ordering the arrest of Tareq al-Hashemi, his respected Sunni vice president, on terrorism charges.
Further escalating tensions, he also asked parliament to hold a no-confidence vote to allow him to dismiss Saleh al-Mutlak, the Sunni deputy prime minister, who angered Mr Maliki by describing him as a "dictator" during a television interview last week.
Mr Hashemi was briefly detained after being escorted of a plane at Baghdad's airport, where he was attempting to catch a flight to the Kurdish city of Irbil, prompting speculation that he was attempting to flee.
Although Mr Hashemi was released, three of his bodyguards were arrested for "suspected terrorist activity". Following frantic negotiations brokered by the United States and Kurdish political leaders, Mr Maliki was said to have agreed not to implement the arrest warrant for now. 
But last night, judges barred Mr Hashemi from travelling overseas shortly before the arrest warrant was formally issued. Tanks were also deployed outside his home, as well as outside the houses of Mr Mutlak and a third senior Sunni politician.

It's not unexpected, but you'd hope he'd at least have the courtesy to not immediately embarass President Obama.  I suppose nobody wants to late to the Civil War.

12 December, 2011

Crap. I really hope this is wrong.



I'm not sure what bothers me more: that this might be true, or that the only place to get the story is from the alternative media and the Iranians.  One whistleblower site working on the story reports that an Iraqi journalist based in London has told them
"Some of the US forces that left the Ain al-Assad Air base in Iraq last Thursday, did not come back to the USA or its base in Germany, but were transferred to Jordan during the evening hours.”
Furthermore, they add

Update 1: Today at 12:00 P.M. we contacted DOD Press Office via two voicemail messages and one e-mail asking for comment(s) on this story. As of 6:00 P.M. EST we have not heard back.
Update 2: Another journalist with a major mainstream media publication was told by his editors that there would be no coverage or follow up on these developments.


Maybe it isn't what it looks like.  But it sure looks like the media have agreed what to NOT tell the American people.  Again.

Keep your eyes open.

Practicing to block the Straight of Hormuz

Member of the Iranian Parliament says the military was set to practice operations to block the Straight of Hormuz, one of the key choke points for world energy supplies. The Iranian military has not confirmed this, but you can probably expect a rise in oil prices just on the emotional impact of the possibility.



As it is, most of the crude oil and liquefied natural gas of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, the Emirates (and Iran) have to pass through the four-mile wide shipping channel, currently patrolled by the U.S. Navy.

UPDATE 1-Iran army declines comment on MP's Hormuz exercise remarks | Energy & Oil | Reuters

22 November, 2011

No room to cut the "defense" budget?

Of course, comparing expenditures is a crude measure of capabilities, but

I think there must be SOME room to trim.  Pity that if the DoD has its way the cuts will probably protect the pork at the expense of the things (like training) that are really needed.

12 July, 2011

Holy sh#!t

From Danger Room: 100 Firefights, Three Weeks: Inside Afghanistan’s Most Insane Fight: "



Editor’s note: These Marines’ tour was one of the most brutal of the entire war. In its first three weeks in Afghanistan’s Sangin district, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines got into more than 100 firefights, and sustained 62 casualties. The insurgents managed to negate the Marines’ night-vision gear, and rendered their traditional close-combat tactics useless. Things got so bad, the 3/5’s superior officers even suggested pulling their troops back.
That didn’t happen. Instead, the 3/5 went after the militants, hard. They went on the offensive constantly. They leveled booby-trapped compounds without apology. They didn’t bother with school-building until the insurgents were back on their heels. Nor did they mess with the poppy growers; the Marines had more than their fair share of enemies.

When the 3/5 came home, they told counterinsurgency historian Mark Moyar all about their deeply unconventional approach to what was already an unconventional war. An excerpt from Moyar’s 74-page after action report follows.
——
On Oct. 13, the day 3/5 took control of Sangin, the first Marine patrol to leave the wire came under fire 150 feet from the perimeter. One member of this patrol was shot dead. Within the next four days, another eight Marines died.
The extent of the resistance encountered in Sangin surprised many of the Marines. It was stronger than any Taliban resistance that Marines had witnessed previously in Afghanistan. During prior major Marine operations in Helmand, the insurgents had fought toe-to-toe for a few days and then relied primarily on IEDs [improvised explosive devices] and small hit-and-run ambushes. The insurgents in Sangin kept attacking in large numbers, and regrouped for counter-attacks after the initial volleys instead of dispersing.
To maintain morale, officers and NCOs kept their Marines focused on the need to defeat the enemy and avenge the fallen, and kept them active so that they did not have time to mope. “You really can’t prepare a Marine to lose his good buddy or see another one of his buddies with both his legs blown off,” said Captain Chris Esrey, commander of India company. “The best way to overcome that is to get right back out on a patrol the next day because it doesn’t happen every time you go out.”
Comment: "War is Hell" doesn't cover the half of it. These people do the impossible. I can't help but wonder, though--in the long run, was it worth it?

05 July, 2009

Saudis and Israelis

There's an old saying that countries don't have friends, only interests. Like many old sayings, there's a germ of truth in it. And while the enemy of my enemy is most assuredly not my friend, he may be someone I can work with to achieve a common end. Case in point:

The head of Mossad, Israel’s overseas intelligence service, has assured Benjamin Netanyahu, its prime minister, that Saudi Arabia would turn a blind eye to Israeli jets flying over the kingdom during any future raid on Iran’s nuclear sites.

Earlier this year Meir Dagan, Mossad’s director since 2002, held secret talks with Saudi officials to discuss the possibility.

The Israeli press has already carried unconfirmed reports that high-ranking officials, including Ehud Olmert, the former prime minister, held meetings with Saudi colleagues. The reports were denied by Saudi officials.

“The Saudis have tacitly agreed to the Israeli air force flying through their airspace on a mission which is supposed to be in the common interests of both Israel and Saudi Arabia,” a diplomatic source said last week.

The countries don't have formal diplomatic relations, but that doesn't mean much--especially in a part of the world that's noted for deal-making, deception, and war. The Saudis would have to pay a political price, and they would have to accept the risk of playing a battlefield in a regional war. The move is a threat to the regime on several levels. However, the threat, especially if it is denied by the governments involved, could rattle the Iranians, and both Israel and Saudi Arabia have reason to consider that a good thing.

Saudis give nod to Israeli raid on Iran - Times Online

02 July, 2009

The Korean War is underway

But don't panic about it. An op-ed in the WSJ points out that since the North Koreans announced in 2003, 2006, and as late as May 26th this year that the Armistice is no longer binding on them, it means it is no longer binding for the UN (US) forces, either.

I doubt we'll see American ships fire on North Korean any time soon, but legally the US is within its rights to do so.

Perhaps North Korea should reconsider its position on the Armistice?

How to Stop North Korea's Weapons Proliferation - WSJ.com

30 June, 2009

A glass half full in Afghanistan

Bill Lind does his typical excellent job analyzing the policy changes initiated by General McChrystal in Afghahistan. My favorite: shifting the official measure of effectiveness from "number of militants killed" (i.e., body counts) to "the number of Afghans shielded from violence." It's harder to estimate, but at least it recognizes what success is supposed to be.

Lind proceeds to a review of many of the structural problems that stand in the way of being as effective (as possible) in Afghanistan.

In sum, General McChrystal faces a full plate. His most difficult challenges are internal, in the form of a flawed military instrument, inadequate doctrine, a neo-liberal Establishment drunk on COIN juju and strategic objectives no commander can attain. Internal challenges are often harder to overcome than those posed by the external opponent, because potential fixes run into the immovable object of court politics.

As an Army friend put it to me, until these and similar internal challenges can be met, our efforts in Afghanistan are like trying to get somewhere by riding faster on an exercise bicycle.

Faster, faster!

Defense and the National Interest » On War #309: Going Nowhere Fast